Memoires & Reminisces

I cannot remember exactly when I first met General Njoroge. But from his Memoire, it is clear he and I served in the same unit briefly during the early months of 1967: he as a newly commissioned officer posted to “B” Company then deployed in Wajir, and I as Officer Commanding (OC) “A” Company then deployed in Mandera. Getting to know each other would have happed had we returned together to Giffard Barracks, the units’ peace time location. As it happened, I got detached whilst in Mandera and transferred to Artillery in Gilgil. A year earlier, Kenya Army HQs had identified me as a potential Battery Captain (BK), and Major Shigoli as potential Battery Commander (BC), but my Commanding Officer (CO) Lt Col Lucas Matu informed Kenya Army that he had better things in store for me. True to his words, Jackson Munyao and I were that year promoted to the rank of Acting Major, he continuing as Adjutant, and me as OC “A” Company.
The Shifta war had by then lasted four years, and 1967 was touted by the Shifta as the culminating year which also coincided with my deployment in Mandera. I was, however, no stranger to Mandera as I had previously served there as 2nd in command (2IC) to Major Godana in “C” Company. What was strange was the intensity of the mine warfare being carried out by the Shifta which made driving in the North-Eastern Province a very dangerous affair. It took me two weeks to hack my way through the bush to reach Mandera without an incident; and whilst in Mandera, the road to the river and the Airstrip had to be swept for mines every morning. The usual routine in operational areas continued until one evening in March when I visited my usual source.
During the four years that we had been fighting the Shifta, one thing we learnt was not to depend entirely on the Special Branch; and so, in Mandera the Army had developed a source at Bula Maskini. That evening he warned me to expect an attack the coming Sunday and as informed, this came to pass. Luckily, we experienced no casualties. A couple of weeks later he warned of an even bigger attack, again on another Sunday. This time we planned to ambush them. The ambush was laid to cover the side they previously occupied from the north by one platoon and the second one to counterattack. The Shifta deployed as expected and opened fire. The ambush platoon responded. Believing the Ethiopians had come to our assistance they fled the scene. We launched the counterattack, not firing on shapes but flashes. The following morning when we visited the scene of the counterattack together with the whole town, we found three bodies, and amazingly one had a bullet right through the middle of the forehead. In all this there was not a single word from Inspector Hillow. However, he later confirmed about the casualties suffered by the Shifta and the belief that the Ethiopians had attacked them. For all intents and purposes this attacked marked the end of the Shifta war.
Soon after this attack, HQs Kenya Army was able to persuade my CO to let me go this time as a Battery Commander BC. It is while conducting live fire exercises in Dol Dol that General Njoroge saw me for the first time. We must have also briefly met in January 1974 when I was posted to AFTC for an extremely short time. The longest stretch of time that General Njoroge and I worked closely together was, however, from 1977 to 1981 in AFTC where I started off as CO Leader Wing, then Chief instructor and eventually Commandant. His attention to detail, enthusiasm, unflagging spirit, and can- do attitude sold themselves to me so much so that when I was tasked to establish the Defence Staff College, I spirited him from the Air Force.
That spirit, enthusiasm and attention to detail pervades this book. Much has been written about me. In truth, I was but a conveyor of ideas, visions, and perspectives that General Njoroge, and many others I worked closely with, shared with me. A case in point is the so called “Tonje Rules”. There are no such rules. The only contribution I made was to convince the Defence Council and the Commander-in-Chief of the need to have fixed tenures of four years for CGS and Service Commanders, and to have the appointment of CGS rotate among the services. In hindsight, I should have suggested a more equitable formula. As it is, the current practice is unfair to those joining the Army. A better formula would have been 4:2:1 i.e., Army/Army/AF/Army/Army/AF/Navy.
The other idea not so well understood is the five pillars of training. I conceived this idea in 1994, when I was appointed Army Commander. The idea was to inculcate in my officers and men the need to be good citizens, good soldiers, professionals able to take on jobs two up and conscious of strengths and weaknesses two down, respect for the cultures, traditions, and religions of those they serve together; and finally, that as they enter, planning for resettlement on exit, primarily through savings and investment.
Finally, I wish to correct the notion that 11 K.A.R mutinied because of pay and that there was a sit-in. There was no such thing. Both “B” and “C” Companies were out on training a week before the mutiny occurred. In fact, “C” Company arrived the day the mutiny took place. What happened is that while we were in the field, Tanzanian Officers frog-marched their British Officers and put them on a plane to Nairobi in their night gowns. Their counterparts in Kenya scrambled us in the field presumably to go and restore the situation. But once we got to the barracks, they disappeared, and the unit became rudderless. Then funny movements began where the white officers and their NCOs started congregating, reconnoitering the camp, and setting communication presumably to warn themselves of something. This perplexed the men, but the African Officers being only lieutenants had no a nswers. Then one evening we were told that there would be an announcement about pay by the Prime Minister during the nine o’clock news that night, but nothing of the sort happened. On the second day the same thing happened and then there was a shooting in the camp. I dashed from the mess to the company lines but on the way, I met Captain Cameron, my Company Commander, bringing a dead soldier on a stretcher to the Medical Reception Centre. At the Armoury, furious soldiers were breaking in. That night we tried to reason with the soldiers but to no avail. However, at about 11 o’clock the following day, ferret scout cars started strafing the unit along Dundori road and as they receded two members of the crew were shot dead or so the soldiers believed. Revenge having been exacted, they finally laid down their arms. These are not the actions of persons agitating for pay.
Promises to Keep and Miles to Go is a very good read for anybody wishing to understand colonial life in Kenya. It mirrors the lives of the elites who populate our schools, straddle public stages, pervade the private sector, and command the airwaves. It is a book every serving officer should have on their bookshelf. I congratulate General Njoroge for filling this void.
In conclusion, I wish to take the advantage of the honour extended to me by General Njoroge to share with readers my vision of our beloved continent Africa. The vision is predicated on the premise that the sell-by date of the Berlin Conference states is long past gone, and a new Africa in tune with Africa’s aspirations, history, and culture should long have occurred. My clarion call, therefore, is for the good people of Africa to work for “One Africa Today”.

Show More

Show Less

It is not common that an actor’s lived professional experience mirrors to a large extent the developmental history of their grounding institution. This duality grants Gen Humphrey Njoroge - a member of the second cohort of secondary school graduates to join the Kenya Military in 1966 - personal, professional qualifications and authority to speak about contemporary and future strategic security issues in Kenya. Through his reminisces, we travel back in time to grasp the dynamics anchoring the development, deployment, and employment of the Kenya Defence Forces’ [KDF] mission of securing the State.
Gen. Njoroge enjoins us to reflect around four questions: what is the centrality of, and how should variables of, family, culture a nd faith be used in the development of the moral fiber of officers and the broader institution? How should diversity, recruitment, promotion, and force management be mobilized to anchor a professional and patriotic force in a multi -ethnic setting? Why is strategic level formation and institutional development core in critical strategic culture development and normalization of the instruments of power? What is the centrality of the Military institution in state and leadership development?
These questions effectively underpin insights on elements critical to enabling the development of a military establishment capable of guaranteeing peace through force capability and capacity; and to foster regeneration in waging and prevailing in war. First and core is the role of family values whose roots Gen. Njoroge attributes to a triumvirate of strong-willed women: his grand-mother, mother, and dear wife. For an infantry officer, this is a soul- searching confession, betraying the soft part of a species of humans socialized to kukaa ngumu.
Second are personal and professional interactions between Gen. Njoroge and his role models, mentors, and father figures, Gen. Mahmoud Mohammed, and Gen. Daudi Tonje. It is not hard to discern the underpinning dynamics that helped to chisel Gen. Njoroge. Alongside Gen. Mohammed and the 1 Kenya Rifles family of officers from Kahawa , then Maj. Njoroge would be at the core of suppressing the 1982 coup d’etat. Reflections on these offer fault- lines for interrogations to be taken up by historians, political and military scientists on a wide range of issues: state crisis, military institutional management, and a gamut of constitutional issues under-girded by loyalty to the constitution. These are complemented by his role in operationalizing the development of infrastructure that remain core to professionalizing the KDF personnel, especially the operational level Defense Staff College [DSC] and the strategic level National Defense College (NDC) of Kenya. Commitment to this mission command is about operationalizing Gen. Daudi Tonje’s vision for transforming the Kenya Armed Forces for 21st century challenges.
Thirdly, success in these suggests the need for profound reflections on the management of ethnic questions: through fairness in recruitment, promotions, and evolution of professional officers driven by nationalism and the desire to serve. Gen. Njoroge notes rightly that this is complemented by strategic level institutions like the NDC. Its principle of non-attribution enables the development of an intellectual culture mediated by a critical appreciation of national, regional, and global security issues. The praxis of this was apparent in his tenure as Commandant of the NDC, which also coincided with political transitions in Kenya. That era also cemented National Security Policy formulation studies, and the core concept of a three-legged stool as an analytical framework.
His engagement in the counter-insurgency operations against the Shifta earlier on in his career allows him to ground his reflections on the appropriation of colonial strategic security culture. That culture emphasized the execution of operational orders leading to the defeat of insurgents. However, it fell short in the main efforts of state building through response to distance decay crises by way of Grand Strategy formulation. Prof Mwagiru et al note that this underpins contemporary banditry and nascent insurgency.
Gen. Njoroge’s operationalization of the principle of non-attribution, mediation of academic, military, and political actor interaction at NDC invites us to examine the process and value of demystifying the false military- academic-opposition politics animosity. It equally enhances the interrogation of national security issues through mutually reinforcing engagement fastened to loyalty to the Constitution. The progression of these underpins continuing value addition by successor KDF Chiefs of the Defence Forces, many of them alumna of the NDC. It also enhances appreciation of the role of the military in internal security, and the importance of loyalty to the state through fidelity to the Constitution.
This is a timely, refreshing, and worthwhile book, one of the few memoires written by Kenyan Generals. I recommend those wishing to reflect on these issues to read Gen. Njoroge’s deep but refreshing Promises to Keep and Miles to Go: Reminisces of the 11th 3 Star Kenyan General.

Show More

Show Less

I read all the chapters of this Memoire as they were produced, revisited them in their reincarnations [aka revised form], and as complete drafts of the emerging book. Recalling and sometimes re-living, the many experiences - and issues, and manenos - in General Njoroge’s long and distinguished career in the Kenya military took some remembering and writing - and some time. The time taken was four years [according to the General] or 4½ years, seven weeks, and twenty-six days [according to me]. Not to niggle about half a year though, but it is worth noting that two of them were during the Covid-19 pandemic, one of whose unintended consequences was clearly to preoccupy Generals with memoire writing.
General Njoroge was rightly keen to preface his memoires by recalling his early life. His memory of it began as he started school during the early Mau Mau war period, the Princess’s ascent to the throne on top of a tree at a place called Tree Tops, and her visit to the colonial’s farm where the General’s parents eked a living. He remembers the latter clearly: the young pupils lined up on the dusty 10 kms route “from Engineer Centre to Gwakinyahwe home”. And as they did so, they waved Union Jacks with extreme excitement, and wore King George VI medals on their shirt [he does not mention blouse] pockets. This convinced me that maybe there were some good reasons for beginning a memoire with early life. The road to this convincing was marked by impassioned debates fronted by Prof. Musambayi Katumanga supported kufa na kupona by the General. I succumbed under this Professorial and Generic [sic!] pressure. Not entirely tongue-in-cheek, the story of the Princess and the medals gives readers an inkling where the General’s medal gathering - not to be confused with accumulation of them - career was probably first inspired.
Promises to Keep and Miles to Go insists at many points that recruitment to the Kenya military fishes from some of the best students in Kenyan high schools. The General is very keen on this aspect. In some countries, soldiers are the least respected segment of the population because they were recruited from amongst those who could not get into any other profession. General Njoroge must have had this in mind having been trained at barely an impressionable 20 years in a UK military training school. So alas! memories return and teach lessons to be avoided.

What repeatedly stands out in this memoire is that General Njoroge is a gifted trainer of people[s]. Indeed, most likely had he not defected from Kagumo High School barely one third of the way through “A” levels, he would have gone on to university and become an outstanding teaching Professor. This was clear when sometimes in 2003/4, the NDC students were set for an overseas tour. A Junior Directing Staff was trudging to the bus taking the students to the airport, weighed down by 40 or so theses. On my enquiry about what goes on with the load, he whispered that the Commandant was taking them to read during the trip. “Ha!” was my response, “I’ve heard such stories before among lecturers, and even tried the self-deception myself!”. On the students’ return from the tour, seeking out the JDS, I was shown the theses, read, and sprinkled at the margins with comments in pencil. While not able to decipher the handwriting [this is being written on a Sunday, not exactly the day to dismiss a General’s handwriting as generic [pun fully intended] and indecipherable scribblings], I nevertheless acknowledged that I was standing in the domain of a master teacher. Promises to Keep and Miles to Go is full of such notifications of a great and gifted trainer: like making students run up hills in desert climates, take a red mark examination before even getting their breath back, and being graded in a competitive fashion in the same one-hour period or so.
A striking feature of Promises to Keep is that the General was involved in the setting up of multiple military schools in Kenya, from the tactical School of Infantry, the operational Defence Staff College, and the strategic National Defence College; and others that were began, and then unbegun. While the General’s connection with these schools is clear, his love for the NDC is evident, and open and heart felt, an affair that lingers two-score years after retirement. It is fitting that the General set-off into retirement from the gates of that College. And the love remains at the ending of this Memoire: his home in Nairobi, church, and local pub are all within roaring distance of his hallowed college.
The General’s true post-retirement passion has been the welfare of retired soldiers and officers, and the possibility of their contribution to nation-building. He clearly did think about it during active service. His continuing esteem and great admiration of his mentor, the architect of the “Tonje Rules” and 5 Pillars of Military Training General Daudi Tonje, is touching and heartening and revealing. It may be however that the discourse on the resettlement pillar needs more public debate, especially s ince a million civil servants must be touched by the same concern. Promises to Keep and Miles to Go sometimes leads the reader to feel that the core principles of civil -military relations are appreciated from the head but not from the soul. It has however opened a new frontier of civil-military relations discourse in Kenya [and elsewhere] that has sometimes been suggested in public debates in the country, but from which stakeholders have shied away.
I have read many memoires of Generals from around the world. Sadly, only a few of them - two from Kenya, one from Zambia, and another from Nigeria - have been written by African Generals. This is a great and enduring sadness. Their knowledge and experience embedded in the operational environment of Africa is much needed to prompt debates on common matters of state interaction and survival.
Promises to Keep sets the bar for authorship high. General Njoroge has recounted his experiences in a very engaging and refreshi ng way. But it is not mere reading for the odd Sunday afternoon. It is replete with history and analysis, which anybody at civil [in schools, and humanities and social science faculties] and military institutions at whatever level will be enriched by readi ng. It is a valuable book, and a great contribution to the literature on strategic planning, Kenya’s military history, grand strategy, and other things that matter.
By the metrics he offers in the Prologue for judging the success of a General, General Njoroge was an immensely successful General of Kenya. The metrics of judging the standing of Promises to Keep and Miles to Go as a work of scholarship, art, literature, and promoter of intellectual debate are different. At post-graduate schools, writers of theses and dissertations are always reminded that their offerings will be judged by one core metric: if the examiner was heading off to an island, and allowed to carry only three of the theses, whether theirs would be among them. For me, if this Memoire was to take that test, I would include it first amongst the three. Without doubt, readers of Promises to Keep and Miles to Go shall reach the same conclusion. It is that kind of book. Clearly it will also put to rest forever the cabbage rearing pyrotechnics of folks who, on receiving the “Red Card” commence endless perambulations around their offices, uttering the ever-green truths of Andrew Marvel’s poem: “At my back I always hear time’s winged chariots drawing nigh”.

Show More

Show Less